sec(license): Ed25519 sigs + production-safe tripwire
Two coupled hardening upgrades. 1. Asymmetric signatures (HMAC → Ed25519) The previous HMAC scheme used a symmetric secret that any motivated reverse engineer could pull out of the shipped binary and use to mint blobs for any tier / name / email. With Ed25519, the binary ships only the public verification key; the signing key never leaves the seller's environment, so binary compromise no longer yields forgery. - src/license/crypto.py rewritten around cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric.ed25519. Same public API surface (sign/verify/encode_blob/decode_blob), same canonical JSON encoding — drop-in for the manager / cli / GUI layers. - DATATOOLS_LICENSE_PRIVKEY (seller-side) and DATATOOLS_LICENSE_PUBKEY (build-time) env vars supply the keys; the in-source dev keypair (src/license/_dev_keypair.py) deterministically derives from a seed phrase for repro builds and tests. - Blob prefix bumped DTLIC1: → DTLIC2:. Decoding a DTLIC1 blob surfaces a clear "old format" error rather than a confusing signature mismatch. - scripts/generate_keypair.py mints fresh production keypairs for the seller (run once, stash the private key offline). Adds cryptography>=41,<46 to requirements.txt (was an undeclared transitive dep). 2. Production-safe tripwire assert_production_safe() refuses to boot a frozen / shipped build when either: - DATATOOLS_DEV_MODE=1 is set (would unconditionally bypass every license check — fine in source/test but catastrophic in a buyer install). - The active verification key is still the embedded dev key (the build pipeline forgot to set DATATOOLS_LICENSE_PUBKEY). No-op in source / pytest runs (sys.frozen is unset) so test fixtures and dev workflows keep working without ceremony. Called from src/cli_license_guard.guard() and from hide_streamlit_chrome — so it fires on every CLI invocation and every GUI page load. Tests: 49 license-layer unit tests (was 40); added Ed25519 wrong-key rejection, dev-keypair seed pin, blob v2 prefix, v1 rejection with clear message, and four production-safe scenarios (no-op in source, fires on DEV_MODE in frozen, fires on dev key in frozen, passes in frozen with prod pubkey). Total: 2024 → 2033. Docs (REQUIREMENTS §17a, DEVELOPER licensing recipe, DECISIONS §9b + decision log) updated with the new threat-model write-up, key-storage workflow, and tripwire behaviour. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -34,12 +34,21 @@ from .errors import (
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UnsupportedFeatureError,
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)
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from .features import FEATURES_BY_TIER, all_features_for_tier
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from .manager import LicenseManager, current_state, get_manager, require_feature
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from .manager import (
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LicenseManager,
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ProductionBuildError,
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assert_production_safe,
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current_state,
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get_manager,
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require_feature,
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)
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from .schema import FeatureFlag, License, Tier
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__all__ = [
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# Manager
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"LicenseManager",
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"ProductionBuildError",
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"assert_production_safe",
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"current_state",
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"get_manager",
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"require_feature",
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